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For two different regulatory standards, we examine the optimalmin-
imum wage in a competitive labor market when the government is
uncertain about supply and demand. Solutions are related to under-
lying supply and demand conditions, and to the extent of uncertainty
and of rationing efficiency. With expected earnings maximization,
greater uncertainty widens the range of parameter values for which
a minimumwage should be set. With expected worker surplus maxi-
mization and sufficiently efficient rationing, a minimumwage should
always be set. However, in both cases regulatory uncertainty may
require a lowminimumwage that may not bind in equilibrium.
1 INTRODUCTION
Astatutoryminimumwagehas been a common feature of public policy formany years, and currently operates in 26out
of 34Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD)member countries. Some parts of theUnited
States also have “living wage” laws, setting a minimumwage above the federal minimum, while in the United Kingdom
the living wage became a mandatory minimum for workers aged 25 or more in April 2016. Although the effects of a
minimum wage remain controversial, changes in the sectoral mix of employment in developed economies associated
with globalization and the recent recession have aroused new interest in its use.Manymanufacturing and construction
jobs have been lost that are unlikely to be replaced, whereas there has been an expansion of relatively low-paid work,
such as in wholesale and retail trade, and accommodation and food services (OECD, 2015).1
When aminimumwage is introduced or raised some low-paidworkerswill receive higherwage rates, but theremay
be an overall negative impact on employment. Econometric evidence on this trade-off, which is reviewed by Neumark,
Salas, andWascher (2014), generally relates to the effects of small changes in aminimumwage. However, there is little
evidence on the impact of larger changes, or for the introduction of a minimum wage. Thus, for example, a minimum
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and repro-
duction in anymedium, provided the original work is properly cited.
c© 2017 The Authors Journal of Public Economic Theory Published byWiley Periodicals, Inc.
1 In the United States, the real wage for low-skill workers has declined for the last 30–40 years. Balart (2016) argues that this is largely the result of improved
incentives to attend college, and he shows in a signalingmodel how this can adversely affect the average ability of the non–college educated.
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 2017;19:1136–1153. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jpet 1136
BENNETT AND CHIOVEANU 1137
wage law was rejected by Switzerland in 2014, but introduced by Germany in 2015 and will come into operation in
South Africa in 2018, in each case after years of heated debate about the size of the potential effects.
To capture someof the issues involved,we formulate amodel inwhich the governmentmaybe imperfectly informed
about supply and demand conditionswhen it sets theminimumwage (there is “regulatory uncertainty”) whereaswork-
ers andfirmshaveall the relevant informationwhenemployment takesplace.2 This information structuremaybe inter-
preted to cover a situationwhere theminimumwage is fixed for a periodoverwhich anewset ofmarket conditionsmay
obtain.3 Alternatively, it could pertain to a single realization of a market in which both labor supply and labor demand
are identically and independently distributed, and the government knows the parameters of the distributions. We use
this formulation to derive the optimal level, if any, of the minimum wage for two different regulatory standards. For
simplicity, we do not include in the analysis any other regulatory tools, such as an income tax.
We examine a perfectly competitive low-wage segment of the labor market. The assumption of perfect competi-
tion simplifies the analysis and has the advantage of being a particularly testing environment for a minimum wage,
as it emphasizes the potential negative employment effects compared to when there is monopsony or search-and-
matching in the labor market (see, e.g., Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 2014). In this context, if the government's objec-
tive were to maximize expected welfare, no minimum wage would be set. However, the primary goal of minimum-
wage policy is to redistribute earnings to low-productivity workers (Freeman, 1996). This goal may be represented
in various ways, but a simple and widely used formulation is in terms of the total earnings from the minimum wage
(Sobel, 1999). We therefore derive the minimum wage that maximizes the expected earnings of minimum wage
workers.4
Nonetheless, as highlighted by L. Danziger (2009), the use of total earnings as ameasure does not take into account
workers' reservation wages, which reflect the value of unemployment benefits, leisure, and home production. If reser-
vation wages are netted out, the goal instead becomes the maximization of “worker surplus,” a term that was intro-
duced by Marshall (1920) as a particular type of producer surplus. Insofar as reservation wages reflect alternative
earnings, worker surplus may bemore appropriate than total earnings as a measure of the financial benefit to workers
earning the minimum wage. However, allowance for the value of leisure, a nonpecuniary element, makes it a measure
of worker welfare. As an alternative to expected earnings maximization, we also analyze the expected worker surplus-
maximizingminimumwage.5
When a minimum wage is set, if it binds efficient rationing of employment would require that the available work
goes to individuals with the lowest reservation wages amongst those willing to work at that wage. However, the min-
imum wage may prevent some workers with lower reservation wages from competing by accepting relatively low
wages. Job allocation may be inefficient, with personal contacts or prejudice playing a role.6 Direct evidence on ineffi-
ciency of employment rationing is sparse, though Luttmer (2007) finds that no such inefficiency is associated with the
1990–1991 rise in the U.S. federal minimumwage. Nonetheless, Luttmer cautions that this evidence relates to a small
2 Regulatory uncertainty stems fromdiverse sources, and is distinct fromeconomic policy uncertainty,which relates to private agents'perceptions of potential
government behavior. Even under settled economic conditions, a government will face some uncertainty about labor market conditions, but sectoral adjust-
ments in economic activitymaymake the fine-tuning ofminimum-wage policymore challenging, and, historically, periods of lower growth have coincidedwith
higher levels of uncertainty (Bloom, 2014).
3 In practice, most OECD countries review minimum wage levels every year, or nearly every year, though the federal minimum in the United States was
unchanged from September 1997 to July 2007 (seeOECD, 2015).
4 Freeman argues that the effect of a minimumwage on total earnings in a competitive labor market may go in either direction and “[i]t is the balancing of risk
against gain that makes aminimum so controversial” (Freeman, 1996, p. 639).
5 In practice governments have not specified explicit objective functions, and various further implications of a minimum wage have been considered. In the
German debate these have included the fiscal impact, the effects on shadow activities, and the incentive to leave education (IZA, 2014). Other potential con-
siderations include the effects on non-wage worker benefits (Schmitt, 2013) and on the welfare of the poor through increases in consumer prices (MaCurdy,
2015).
6 Portugal and Cardoso (2006) and subsequent studies find that a higher minimum wage is associated with lower job turnover. One possible explanation is
that, insofar as the higherminimumwage causes jobs to be kept by peoplewhowouldmove in a freermarket, the rationing of jobs is inefficient. Also, resources
may have been expended to reach the efficient outcome (e.g., search costs or waiting).
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increase in the minimumwage, and that inefficient allocation might nonetheless follow a large increase. We therefore
parameterize rationing inefficiency in our analysis.7
We use simple quadratic formulations of aggregate reservation wages and nonlabor costs, so that labor supply and
demand functions are linear.8 Throughout,we refer to labor supply in termsof the participation decision, but themodel
could instead be interpreted in terms of the hours of work decision. For simplicity, we consider regulatory uncertainty
first over labor supply and then over labor demand, and we highlight some important differences of detail. We relate
our solutions to the underlying supply and demand conditions and the degree of uncertainty the government faces.
Also, for expected worker surplus maximization, the extent of rationing inefficiency matters, although it is not rele-
vant for expected earnings maximization. For each objective, we show that, if uncertainty is great enough, the optimal
minimumwagemay ormay not bind, depending on the resolution of the uncertainty.
In a textbookmodelwith no uncertainty, tomaximize total earnings theminimumwage is set such that the elasticity
of labor demand is (minus) unity, provided this minimum wage binds. If it does not bind, a minimum wage should not
be set. With uncertainty, our analysis of expected earnings maximization generalizes this result. We show that if the
uncertainty is over labor supply, the optimal level of the minimum wage is still at unit-elastic labor demand, while if
there is labor-demand uncertainty, the optimal minimum wage may be below the unit-elastic level for the mean labor
demand curve. However, for each form of uncertainty, the side condition for setting any minimum wage is that the
specified level binds for the minimum possible realization of the free market wage. This shows that the presence of
regulatory uncertainty widens the range of parameter values for which a minimum wage should be set, and greater
uncertainty widens this range.
When, instead, the objective is to maximize expected worker surplus, then for both labor supply uncertainty and
labor demand uncertainty a minimum wage should always be set if the rationing of employment is efficient enough. If
uncertainty is sufficiently small, theminimumwage should be set at a level that is sure to bind, and is above the level at
which demand is unit-elastic. However, with greater uncertainty of either type, the minimum wage should be set at a
lower level, and may or may not bind. By not setting a high minimumwage, large potential declines in employment are
avoided; but by nonetheless setting one, though at a relatively low level, some protection is provided against ex post
realizations of uncertainty that would result in a low free market wage. Inefficiency of rationing complements uncer-
tainty over supply or demand, in that it reduces the critical amount of uncertainty at which the government chooses a
minimumwage that may ormay not bind, rather than one that is sure to bind.
However, if inefficiency is sufficiently great, no minimum wage should be set. All employment at the minimum
wage gives a higher worker surplus than would be obtained in a free market. With inefficient rationing some of this
employment is of workers who displace others who value employmentmore than themselves. If rationing is inefficient
enough, the loss in expected worker surplus due to such inefficient reallocations, together with the lower expected
labor demand, can fully offset the aggregate expected benefits from the employment at the higher wage.9
The effect of aminimumwageonworker surplus is analyzed by L.Danziger (2009). In hismodel, risk-averseworkers
face uncertainty about whether they will find a job, and the minimum wage that maximizes expected worker surplus
is derived. Also, in an analysis of how a minimum wage may be set by bargaining, Boeri (2012) assumes that the gov-
ernment uses a welfare function that may include a higher weight on worker surplus (and this assumption is in effect
made by Lee & Saez, 2012; see below). Moreover, in labor market matching models, worker surplus—defined as the
difference between the value of employment and the value of unemployment—has played a prominent role (see Jung
&Kuhn, 2014, for a recent example).
7 The effect of rationing inefficiency in the context of price ceilings is considered in several recent papers (see Glaeser & Luttmer, 2003; Davis & Kilian, 2011;
Bulow&Klemperer, 2012).
8 The informational set-up in our model, together with quadratic approximations of cost and benefit, was first formulated by Weitzman (1974) to compare
alternative regulatory instruments in a planned economy. The framework has since been adapted to various contexts, including monopoly regulation in a
mixed economy and environmental policy, but it has not, to our knowledge, been applied to the labor market. For a recent formulation, see Schlee (2013).
9 When there is no regulatory uncertainty the worker surplus–maximizing minimumwage is on the elastic (inelastic) part of the labor demand curve for high
(low) enough rationing efficiency. Thus, it is greater (smaller) than the earnings-maximizing minimumwage for high (low) rationing efficiency. The comparison
is not so clear-cut in the presence of regulatory uncertainty.
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The effect of a minimum wage used in combination with an income tax in a competitive economy is analyzed in a
stream of papers beginning with Allen (1987) and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987). In these models, the case for setting
any minimum wage is sensitive to the assumptions made. For example, in Allen's model, where labor supply is formu-
lated as an hours of work decision, a minimum wage is of no value if optimal nonlinear income taxation is possible.
However, with the restriction to optimal linear income taxation there is scope for welfare-enhancing redistribution
through aminimumwage.
More recently, abstracting from the hours of work decision, Lee and Saez (2012) derive sufficient conditions—
including efficiency of rationing and valuation by the government of redistribution toward low-wage workers—for it
to be optimal to set a binding minimumwage, both with and without optimal taxes and transfers. Also, E. Danziger and
Danziger (2015) show in a perfectly competitivemodel with hours choice byworkers that a graduatedminimumwage,
in combination with an optimal nonlinear income tax, can provide a Pareto improvement over an optimal income tax
alone.10
Our framework may be applicable when optimal taxation is not feasible, and it deals with a different type of uncer-
tainty. In the optimal tax literature, the asymmetric information relates to the government's lack of knowledge of indi-
vidual characteristics, rather than to incomplete information about aggregate supply and demand. Nonetheless, when
there is no uncertainty and the restriction of efficient rationing is made, our model is a linear equivalent of the Lee and
Saez formulation without taxes and transfers.
Our analysis of the minimumwage is entirely static, disregarding, for example, the consequences for investment in
human and physical capital. In the literature, endogenous growth models give potentially positive growth effects of a
minimumwage. For example, Cahuc andMichel (1996) assume that the introduction of a minimumwagemay increase
the demand for skilled labor, so that more human capital is accumulated, promoting economic growth. Similarly, in the
model of Askenazy (2003) a minimumwage causes an effort shift from production to R&D, also stimulating growth.11
However, Economides andMoutos (2016) focus on the incentive to invest in physical capital rather than human capital,
and show that the imposition of a minimum wage reduces the steady-state capital stock, employment, and after-tax
incomes of employedworkers.
In Section 2, we formulate our model. In Sections 3 and 4, we consider the cases of supply uncertainty and demand
uncertainty, respectively, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the appendix.
2 THE MODEL
Consider a competitive labor market in which the government may be uncertain of supply and demand. We assume
that there is no uncertainty on the part of private agents. Workers' aggregated reservation wages for supplying l units
of labor are given by (l,𝜙) = (S + 𝜙)l + sl2∕2, where s > 0, S + 𝜙 > 0. The government regards 𝜙 as a random variable
with zeromean (E(𝜙) = 0), distributed according to a continuous differentiable cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.).
F(𝜙) defined on a closed interval [𝜙min,𝜙max]. The inverse supply of labor is
𝜕(l,𝜙)∕𝜕l = S + 𝜙 + sl.
Thus, S + 𝜙 is the lowest reservation wage in this market and s is the labor supply slope. Producers' gross revenue, net
of nonlabor costs, is given by(l, 𝛾) = (R + 𝛾)l − rl2∕2, where r > 0, R + 𝛾 > 0. The government regards 𝛾 as a random
variable with zero mean (E(𝛾) = 0), distributed according to a continuous differentiable c.d.f. G(𝛾) defined on a closed
interval [𝛾min, 𝛾max]. The inverse demand (marginal revenue product) for labor is
𝜕(l, 𝛾)∕𝜕l = R + 𝛾 − rl,
with intercept R + 𝛾 and slope−r.
10 The combination of aminimumwage and optimal taxation when the labor market is monopsonistic is analyzed by Cahuc and Laroque (2014).
11 See Fanti and Gori (2011) for a relatedmodel and a survey of this literature.
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The respective supply and demand functions for labor are therefore
ls(w,𝜙) = (w − S − 𝜙)∕s and ld(w, 𝛾) = (R + 𝛾 − w)∕r, (1)
wherew is the wage rate. The elasticity of demand for labor is (minus) unity atw = R∕2.
We assume that the two shocks 𝜙 and 𝛾 are independent and that the hazard rates F′(𝜙)∕(1 − F(𝜙)) and G′(𝛾)∕(1 −
G(𝛾)) are strictly increasing.12
The government chooses a minimum wage w̄, which is announced to all private agents (firms and workers), who
observe the realized values of 𝜙 and 𝛾 , and then generate labor supply and demand functions (1). Employment and
production then take place. w̄ is chosen tomaximize the expectation of earningswl ≡ Υ orworker surpluswl − (l,𝜙) ≡
Ω. In practice, the timedimension for aminimumwagevaries betweencountries (e.g., it is hourly in theUnitedKingdom,
weekly inMalta, andmonthly in Belgium). Our analysis can be interpreted in any of these units.
Denote the ex post–free market wage (where ls(w) = ld(w)) by w∗(𝜙, 𝛾) and the corresponding employment level by
l∗(𝜙, 𝛾). Thus,
w∗(𝜙, 𝛾) = [(S + 𝜙)r + (R + 𝛾)s]∕(r + s) and l∗(𝜙, 𝛾) = (R + 𝛾 − S − 𝜙)∕(r + s). (2)
To ensure a well-defined equilibrium employment ex post, we assume that R + 𝛾min > S + 𝜙max. But, before the demand
and supply shocks 𝜙 and 𝛾 are realized, the government viewsw∗(𝜙, 𝛾) as a random variable with expected value
w∗e = (Sr + Rs)∕(r + s). (3)
Aminimumwage rate w̄may or may not bind. If it binds, that is, if w̄ > w∗(𝜙, 𝛾), then employment l(w̄) = ld(w̄, 𝛾); if it
does not bind, that is, if w̄ ≤ w∗(𝜙, 𝛾), the free-market equilibrium (2) obtains. Thus, if ls(w̄,𝜙) > ld(w̄, 𝛾), employment is
l(w̄) = ld(w̄, 𝛾); but if ls(w̄,𝜙) ≤ ld(w̄, 𝛾), employment is l(w̄) = l∗(𝜙, 𝛾).
Given the distributions of 𝜙 and 𝛾 , three ranges for w̄ may be distinguished. In the “high” range w̄ is so high that it
binds for all realizations of uncertainty. In the “low” range w̄ is so low that it is nonbinding for all realizations of uncer-
tainty. However, in the “middle” range w̄may or may not bind, depending on the value of 𝜙 (for stochastic supply) or 𝛾
(for stochastic demand). We consider the minimumwage first for stochastic supply and then for stochastic demand.13
We examine each of these ranges as a potential location for the optimal value of w̄, and we derive and compare the
results for the two objective functions of the government.
If w̄ > w∗(𝜙, 𝛾) there is an excess supply of labor at the minimum wage w̄, so that l = ld(w̄, 𝛾) = (R + 𝛾 − w̄)∕r and
employment is rationed. Insofar as rationing is inefficient, employment is not all allocated to the workers with the low-
est reservationwages.Weparameterize rationing efficiency for the case inwhich the governmentmaximizes expected
worker surplus by writing its objective function as a linear combination of the expected worker surplus for efficient
rationing and for extreme inefficient rationing of employment among those who are willing to work at w̄, with weights
𝛼 and 1 − 𝛼, respectively (𝛼 ∈ [0,1]).
If work is allocated efficiently, that is, to the workers whose reservation wages are lowest, worker surplus is
w̄ld(w̄, 𝛾) − [(S + 𝜙)ld(w̄, 𝛾) + s(ld(w̄, 𝛾))2∕2] =
(R + 𝛾 − w̄)[2r(w̄ − S − 𝜙) − s(R + 𝛾 − w̄)]∕2r2 ≡ Ω𝛼(ld(w̄, 𝛾),𝜙).
Now suppose instead that ld(w̄, 𝛾) is allocated extremely inefficiently, that is, to those workers with the highest reser-
vation wages among those willing to work at wage w̄. Then, employment ld(w̄, 𝛾) = (R + 𝛾 − w̄)∕r is along the high-
est part of the supply curve below w̄, that is, from ls(w̄,𝜙) − ld(w̄, 𝛾) to ls(w̄,𝜙). At ls(w̄,𝜙) − ld(w̄, 𝛾) worker surplus is
12 The strictly increasing hazard rate assumptions guarantee the single-peakedness of expected worker surplus. Intuitively, they require the c.d.f.s (F and G)
to be light-tailed (i.e., to have relatively small variance). If the density function F′(𝜙) (G′(𝛾)) is log-concave, or if it is strictly increasing and the survival function
1 − F(𝜙) (1 − G(𝛾)) is log-concave, then the hazard rate of F (G) is strictly increasing.
13 In principle, the model could also be developed with the two types of uncertainty together, but the interplay of constraints then makes the analysis
intractable. The results for stochastic supply and demand separately are qualitatively similar, although, particularly for expected earningsmaximization, there
are significant differences of detail.
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w̄ − S − 𝜙 − s(ls(w̄,𝜙) − ld(w̄, 𝛾)) per unit of ld(w̄, 𝛾), while at ls(w̄,𝜙) it is zero. Taking the mean of these two values, and
multiplying by ld(w̄, 𝛾), gives total worker surplus,
ld(w̄, 𝛾){w̄ − S − 𝜙 − s[ls(w̄,𝜙) − (ld(w̄, 𝛾))]}∕2 = s(R + 𝛾 − w̄)2∕2r2 ≡ Ω1−𝛼(ld(w̄, 𝛾),𝜙).
Rationing is efficient if 𝛼 = 1 and extremely inefficient if 𝛼 = 0, whereas if 𝛼 = 1∕2 the allocation of employment is
random among those willing to work.14 For any 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], aggregate worker surplus is therefore
𝛼Ω𝛼(ld(w̄, 𝛾),𝜙) + (1 − 𝛼)Ω1−𝛼(ld(w̄, 𝛾),𝜙) = (R + 𝛾 − w̄) (2r𝛼 (w̄ − S − 𝜙) − s(2𝛼 − 1)(R + 𝛾 − w̄)) ∕2r2 ≡ ΩI(𝜙, 𝛾). (4)
Wewill determine a critical value of 𝛼 above which results for efficient rationing carry over unchanged.
3 STOCHASTIC SUPPLY
We now assume that 𝜙 is a random variable that captures supply uncertainty, while demand is deterministic (𝛾 = 0).
The labor supply and demand schedules become ls(w,𝜙) = (w − S − 𝜙)∕s and ld(w) = (R − w)∕r. From (2), for a given
realization of𝜙, the freemarket wage and employment are
w∗(𝜙) = [(S + 𝜙)r + Rs]∕(r + s) and l∗(𝜙) = (R − S − 𝜙)∕(r + s). (5)
For a givenminimumwage w̄, the equation forw∗(𝜙) defines the specific value𝜙 = 𝜙∗(w̄) at which themarket clears:
𝜙∗(w̄) = (r + s)
(
w̄ − w∗e
)
∕r, (6)
wherew∗e is given by (3).
From the definitions ofw∗(𝜙) and𝜙∗(w), it follows that prob(w∗(𝜙) ≤ w̄) = prob(𝜙 ≤ 𝜙∗(w̄)) = F(𝜙∗(w̄)).
If the minimum wage w̄ is set in the high range, where w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙max), R] (so that 𝜙∗(w̄) > 𝜙max ) it will bind for all
values of𝜙; that is,w = w̄, irrespective of the realization𝜙. If it is set in the low range, where w̄ < w∗(𝜙min) (i.e.,𝜙∗(w̄) <
𝜙min) it does not bind, whatever the value of 𝜙, and so there is market clearance at w = w∗(𝜙). However, in the middle
range where w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)] (so that 𝜙∗(w̄) ∈ [𝜙min,𝜙max]), the effect of the minimum wage depends on the
value of 𝜙. If labor supply is relatively small at each wagew (when 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙∗(w̄),𝜙max]) the minimumwage does not bind
(w = w∗(𝜙)), whereas for a relatively large labor supply (when 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙min,𝜙∗(w̄)]) the minimum wage binds and there
is rationing (w = w̄). For both expected worker surplus and expected earnings maximization, we consider the locally
optimal minimumwage in each of these three ranges separately, and then combine the analyses to examine the global
optimum.
3.1 Expected earnings for stochastic supply
If the government's aim is to maximize expected earnings E(wl) ≡ E(Υ), inefficiency of employment rationing has no
effect on the choice of the minimumwage. Moreover, if there is no uncertainty, the minimumwage should then be set
such that the elasticity of labor demand is (minus) unity if and only if this minimum wage binds. Thus, with no uncer-
tainty R∕2 is the optimal minimum wage if R∕2 > w∗(0), that is, if R(r − s) − 2Sr > 0, which requires that the demand
slope r be sufficiently larger than the supply slope s. Otherwise, no minimum wage should be set. With supply uncer-
tainty, however, wemust consider the three potential ranges for theminimumwage specified above.
First, if the minimum wage is set in the high range, w̄ > w∗(𝜙max), it binds for any 𝜙 ∈ [𝜙min,𝜙max] and employment
is given by labor demand. If R∕2 > w∗(𝜙max) then w̄ = R∕2 is the globally optimalminimumwage. But if R∕2 ≤ w∗(𝜙max)
14 It is easily shown that a convex combination of the values of worker surplus for 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0 equals the value obtained by setting 𝛼 appropriately. In
particular, with equal weights for 𝛼 = 1 and 𝛼 = 0, worker surplus is the same as when 𝛼 = 1∕2.
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F IGURE 1 Expected earnings with stochastic supply
then, for any realization 𝜙, earnings would be greater at w̄ = w∗(𝜙max) than at a higher minimum wage, and so the
expected earnings-maximizingminimumwage is not in the high range.
Second, if the minimumwage is set in the low range, w̄ < w∗(𝜙min), it does not bind for any realization 𝜙, and so the
free-market wagew∗(𝜙)will obtain. Anyminimumwage in this range yields the same outcome as setting w̄ =w∗(𝜙min).
Third, consider the middle range, w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)], so that the corresponding 𝜙∗(w̄) ∈ [𝜙min,𝜙max]. In this
range w̄may or not bind, depending on the realization 𝜙. If 𝜙 ≥ 𝜙∗(w̄), so that w̄ ≤ w∗(𝜙), that is, w̄ does not bind, earn-
ings areΥ(l∗(𝜙)), as evaluated above for w̄ < w∗(𝜙min). If 𝜙 < 𝜙∗(w̄), so that w̄ > w∗(𝜙), which is binding, there is excess
supply and earnings are Υ(ld(w̄)). Combining these two possibilities, we obtain expected earnings for w̄ in the middle
range,
E(Υ) = ∫
𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄)
Υ
(
l∗(𝜙)
)
f(𝜙)d𝜙 + ∫
𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
Υ(ld(w̄))f(𝜙)d𝜙 ≡ Υs. (7)
Comparison of the optimal solution in each of the three ranges gives the following result.
Proposition 1. With labor supply uncertainty, if the wage at which the demand for labor is unit-elastic is at least as large as
the market-clearing wage for the lowest demand realization (i.e., if R∕2 ≥ w∗(𝜙min)) expected earnings E(Υ) are maximized by
setting the minimumwage at this unit-elastic level: w̄ = R∕2. Otherwise, no minimumwage should be set.
This is a simple generalization of the solution when there is no uncertainty, with the constraint R∕2 ≥ w∗(0)
replaced by R∕2 ≥ w∗(𝜙min); that is, substituting for w∗(⋅) from (2), the constraint R(r − s) − 2Sr > 0 is replaced by
R(r − s) − 2(S + 𝜙min)r > 0. Thus, with supply uncertainty the optimal minimum wage, if it exists, is the same as with-
out uncertainty. However, since 𝜙min < 0 , the condition under which this minimum wage should be set is milder than
when there is no uncertainty. Specifically, suppose that R(r − s) − 2Sr < 0, so that if there were no uncertainty there
should be no minimum wage. When instead there is uncertainty, if also 𝜙min is more negative than [R(r − s) − 2Sr]∕2r,
then the minimum wage should be set. Thus, the existence of uncertainty widens the range of parameter values for
which ameaningful (i.e., potentially binding) minimumwage should be set.
The intuition underlying the impact of uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 1. If labor supply is certain, as given by
ls(w,0), then, because the intersection with labor demand ld(w) occurs above R∕2, a minimum wage should not be set.
Now suppose instead that labor supply is uncertain and that𝜙min is sufficiently negative that the lowest possible labor
supply curve, ls(w,𝜙min), intersects ld(w) below R∕2. Assume, as specified in Proposition 1, that the minimum wage is
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set atR∕2. Then, for all ex post realizations of uncertainty such that the supply curve cuts ld(w) above R∕2, theminimum
wage does not bind, and so has no effect. But for any realization such that supply cuts ld(w) below R∕2, the minimum
wage w̄ = R∕2 binds and, by the standard unit-elasticity condition, maximizes earnings. Therefore, considering all pos-
sible realizations of𝜙 together, the imposition of theminimumwage raises expected earnings, and this is because there
is sufficient uncertainty.
3.2 Expectedworker surplus for stochastic labor supply
When expected worker surplus is maximized the solution depends on how efficient rationing is. Again we examine
three potential ranges for theminimumwage w̄.
First, in the high range, w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙max), R], regardless of the realization 𝜙, demand is a binding constraint. Therefore
l = ld(w̄,𝜙) = (R − w̄)∕r and employment is rationed. Total worker surplus is ΩI(𝜙), as given by (4) for 𝛾 = 0. Taking the
expectation over all 𝜙 and differentiating with respect to w̄, the minimum wage that satisfies the first order condition
(f.o.c.) for maximizing expected worker surplus in this range is
ŵ(𝛼) = 𝛼r(R + S) + (2𝛼 − 1)sR
2𝛼(r + s) − s
, (8)
which is increasing in 𝛼, the efficiency of rationing.
However, some restrictions on parameter values are required for E(ΩI(𝜙)) to be concave at w̄ = ŵ(𝛼) and for ŵ(𝛼) to
belong to the interval (w∗(𝜙max), R]. Let𝜙0 denote the value of𝜙 at whichw∗(𝜙) = ŵ(𝛼), that is, from (5) and (8),
𝜙0 =
(R − S)[𝛼(r + s) − s]
2𝛼(r + s) − s
.
This defines the critical level of uncertainty forwhich (8) is a local optimum. It is also necessary that rationing is not “too
inefficient.”We show in the proof to the following lemma that the critical condition is that 𝛼 > s∕(r + s).
Lemma 1. With labor supply uncertainty, if𝜙max <𝜙0 and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), the minimumwage that maximizes expected worker
surplus for w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙max), R] is ŵ(𝛼), as given by (8). If𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0 theminimumwage thatmaximizes expectedworker surplus
cannot be strictly higher than w∗(𝜙max).
Thus, when supply uncertainty is small enough, in the sense that𝜙max is sufficiently small, and if rationing is efficient
enough, there is a local maximum w̄ = ŵ(𝛼) >w∗(𝜙max). For the given mean value (𝜙 = 0) variation of the lower bound
may be accompanied by one or both of a redistribution of themass and a variation of the upper bound. The cutoff level
of uncertainty 𝜙0 is decreasing in 𝛼, so that the condition 𝜙max < 𝜙0 is harder to satisfy if rationing is more efficient,
ceteris paribus.
If instead a minimum wage is set in the low range w̄ < w∗(𝜙min), then, regardless of the realization of 𝜙, it does not
bind. The freemarket wage and employment will bew∗(𝜙) and l∗(𝜙), respectively, as given by (5).Worker surplus is
Ω(l∗(𝜙)) = s(R − S − 𝜙)2∕2(r + s)2, (9)
which is the same for all w̄ < w∗(𝜙min). Expected worker surplus is therefore the same for any minimum wage in this
range (and the same as at w̄ < w∗(𝜙min)).
Finally, consider the middle range w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Parallel to (7) for expected earnings maximization, the
maximand is
E(Ω) = ∫
𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄)
Ω
(
l∗(𝜙)
)
f(𝜙)d𝜙 + ∫
𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
ΩI(𝜙)f(𝜙)d𝜙 ≡ Ωs. (10)
Using these expressions together with Lemma 1, we obtain the next result.
Proposition 2. With labor supply uncertainty and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), the minimum wage that maximizes expected worker surplus
is ŵ(𝛼), as given by (8), if𝜙max < 𝜙0, but lies in the range (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)] and is strictly lower than ŵ(𝛼) if𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0.
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The proposition applies when rationing is sufficiently efficient. Then the location of the expected worker surplus-
maximizing minimum wage depends on the extent of uncertainty. Specifically, if uncertainty is small enough (in the
sense that 𝜙max < 𝜙0, as in Lemma 1) the optimal minimum wage is ŵ(𝛼). This minimum wage is in the high range and
is sure to bind. If, however, uncertainty is greater, the optimal minimum wage is lower; it lies in the middle range and
may or may not bind. In this case, if the minimum wage is ex post binding, so that demand is a constraint, variation of
the supply curve has no effect on employment. However, if ex post the minimum wage does not bind, greater supply
uncertainty generates a smaller expectedworker surplus.15 Since supply uncertainty has a negative effect on expected
worker surplus if the minimum wage does not bind, and no effect if the minimum wage binds, it favors setting a low
minimumwage that is more likely to bind.
Our analysis here rests on the simplifying assumption that 𝜙 is bounded above, and therefore that distinct high
and middle ranges for w̄ exist. If the assumption were dropped and if nonetheless the distribution had a centrally con-
centrated mass, the corresponding result would be that w̄ would be set at a level at which it would bind with a high
probability, rather than certainty. A similar comment applies to the other cases we consider below.
Our qualitative results still obtain if some weight on expected profit is put in the objective function, though if a
minimumwage is then optimal the weight on profit causes it to be lower, and so less likely to bind. A reworking of our
analysis shows that the critical level of rationing efficiency becomes 𝛼 > (s + 𝛽r)∕(r + s), where 𝛽 ∈ [0,1) is the weight
put on profit. With little uncertainty, the optimal value of w̄ in the high range is then decreasing in the weight 𝛽 . A
greater weight on profit is associated with a more stringent requirement on the efficiency of rationing for a binding
minimumwage to be optimal. These remarks also apply to the stochastic-demand case.
Another variation of the model, that would obtain with either of our objective functions, is to allow for some non-
compliance with theminimumwage law. Suppose that, if the minimumwage binds, then, with probability 𝛿 a firm com-
plieswith theminimumwage andwith probability 1 − 𝛿 it sets themarketwage.We can therefore think of a proportion
𝛿 of firms complying and a proportion 1 − 𝛿 not complying. For workers in firms that comply, the expected worker sur-
plus or expected earnings gain from a minimum wage would still apply, but for the others there would be no effect.
Therefore, as in our model, there would be some conditions under which it would be optimal to set aminimumwage.
We now consider further the effect of rationing inefficiency.
Proposition 3. With labor supply uncertainty, if 𝛼 ≤ s∕(r + s), expectedworker surplus is maximized by not setting aminimum
wage.
For 𝛼 ≤ s∕(r + s), the market should be left unregulated, regardless of the degree of supply uncertainty. If, for exam-
ple, labor supply and demand slopes are equal, a minimum wage should not be set if rationing is random or worse.
Moreover, the smaller the demand slope r, relative to the supply slope s, the greater the rationing efficiency 𝛼 required
for a (possibly binding) minimumwage to be optimal.
The role of any rationing inefficiency canbe seenby focusing on the casewith nouncertainty, that is,we consider the
degenerate case with 𝜙min = 𝜙max = 0. In this case the basic result—that to maximize worker surplus when there is no
uncertainty a binding minimumwage should be set, provided rationing is efficient enough—would still hold with more
general demand and supply functions. As an illustration, suppose rationing is efficient (𝛼 = 1). Let ld(w) denote labor
demand and ws(l) inverse labor supply, and assume that 𝜕ld(w)∕𝜕w < 0 and 𝜕ws(l)∕𝜕w > 0. When w ≥ w∗(0), so that
employment is demand-determined (with market clearance a special case), worker surplus is Ω = ∫ ld(w)0 (w − ws(l))dl.
Using the envelope theorem, dΩ(w∗(0))∕dw > 0, that is, a marginal increase in the wage from the free-market equilib-
rium raises worker surplus. A similar result is shown by Lee and Saez (2012) in their proposition 1.
Figure 2 illustrates how worker surplus Ω is related to rationing efficiency when there is no uncertainty. With effi-
cient rationing (𝛼 = 1), Ω is maximized at a binding minimum wage (w̄ = ŵ(1) ) greater than the market-clearing wage
w∗.With less efficient rationing, but still with 𝛼 > 𝛼0,Ω is everywhere lower and ismaximized at a lowerminimumwage
(w̄ = ŵ(𝛼)). For 𝛼 < 𝛼0, dΩ∕dw̄ < 0, so that nominimumwage is set andΩ = Ω(w∗(0)).
15 Worker surplus for a given 𝜙 equals (s∕2)[(R − S − 𝜙)2∕(r + s)2], which is decreasing in𝜙.
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F IGURE 2 Worker surplus for different values of 𝛼 (R∕2 > w∗(0))
It is assumed in Figure 2 thatR∕2 > w∗(0) (i.e.,R(r − s) − 2Sr > 0), so that aminimumwage w̄ = R∕2 should be set for
earnings maximization. To compare the solutions for the two objective functions, the value of 𝛼 for themiddleΩ-curve
is chosen such thatworker-surplusmaximization occurs at w̄ = R∕2. Using (8), ŵ(𝛼) − R∕2 ⪌ 0 as 𝛼 ⪌ Rs∕(Sr + Rs) ≡ 𝛼1.
Thus, 𝛼 = 𝛼1 for the middle Ω-curve. The worker surplus–maximizing minimum wage exceeds that for earnings maxi-
mization if 𝛼 ∈ (𝛼1,1]; but the ranking is reversed if 𝛼 ∈ (𝛼0, 𝛼1]. However, if R(r − s) − 2Sr ≤ 0, an earnings-maximizing
government will not set aminimumwage, whereas aworker surplus–maximizing government will set aminimumwage
if and only if 𝛼 > 𝛼0.
Intuitively, if 𝛼 = 1 the earnings-maximizing minimumwage balances themarginal gain of earnings per unit of labor
from the last increment to thewage against themarginal loss of earnings from lower employment. Starting at this level
of theminimumwage, if instead the objective isworker surplusmaximization, then themarginal gain toworker surplus
from the last increment to the wage is the same. But, because earnings below the reservation wage are excluded from
the objective function, themarginal loss ofworker surplus from the lower employment is smaller than themarginal loss
of earnings. Theminimumwage should therefore be raised further in the worker surplus–maximizing case.
However, compared to 𝛼 = 1, if 𝛼 < 1 the reservation wages of those employed are greater, and so the net gain in
worker surplus from imposing the minimum wage is smaller. Therefore the minimum wage is set lower, and for suffi-
ciently inefficient rationing (𝛼 < 𝛼1) it is set below R∕2.
4 STOCHASTIC LABOR DEMAND
We now focus on the case of stochastic demand, with deterministic supply. There is some asymmetry with the con-
verse case of Section 3 because each of the objective functions relates only to demand, and not to supply, for any given
quantity. Nonetheless, our analysis in this section proceeds similarly to that for stochastic supply, and so some details
are omitted. We show that with expected earnings maximization there is a qualitative difference between the results
for the two types of uncertainty, whereas for expected worker surplus maximization the results are largely similar to
those for stochastic supply.
We assume that 𝛾 is a randomvariable that captures demand uncertainty, while𝜙 is deterministic and equal to zero.
For simplicity, our analysis focuses on aminimumwage that satisfies w̄ > R + 𝛾min; that is, the government only consid-
ers a minimum wage that would result in positive employment and (therefore) positive worker surplus and earnings,
regardless of the realization of the uncertainty.
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Labor supply and demand are now ls(w) = (w − S)∕s and ld(w) = (R + 𝛾 − w)∕r, respectively. The free market wage
and employment are
w∗(𝛾) = [Sr + (R + 𝛾)s]∕(r + s) and l∗(𝛾) = (R + 𝛾 − S)∕(r + s), (11)
and, for a givenminimumwage w̄, (11) defines the specific value 𝛾 = 𝛾∗(w̄) at which themarket clears,
𝛾∗(w̄) = (r + s)
(
w̄ − w∗e
)
∕s. (12)
We again distinguish three ranges of w̄. In the low range w̄ < w∗(𝛾min) (so 𝛾∗(w̄) < 𝛾min ), w̄ is nonbinding for all 𝛾 ∈
[𝛾min, 𝛾max], and themarket clears. In the high range w̄ > w∗(𝛾max) (so 𝛾∗(w̄) > 𝛾max ), and there is labor excess supply for
all values of 𝛾 . Employment is determined by labor demand and is rationed. In themiddle range w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]
(so 𝛾∗(w̄) ∈ [𝛾min, 𝛾max]), and the effect of a minimum wage depends on the value of 𝛾 . For low demand (when 𝛾 ∈
[𝛾min, 𝛾∗(w̄)]) there is excess supply and rationing, whereas for high demand (when 𝛾 ∈ [𝛾∗(w̄), 𝛾max]) w̄ does not bind.
From the definitions ofw∗(𝜙) and𝜙∗(w), it follows that prob(w∗(𝛾) ≤ w̄) = prob(𝛾 ≤ 𝛾∗(w̄)) = G(𝛾∗(w̄)).
4.1 Expected earnings for stochastic labor demand
In our analysis of expectedearningsmaximization for uncertain supply there is a single level of w̄ atwhich labor demand
is unit-elastic. However, with demand uncertainty, for any realization 𝛾 , unit elasticity obtains at w̄ = (R + 𝛾)∕2, that is,
at a different level of w̄ for each 𝛾 . This leads to a qualitative difference between the results for demand uncertainty
and those for supply uncertainty.We again consider three ranges for theminimumwage w̄.
If w̄ is set in the high range, w̄ > w∗(𝛾max) , then for any realization 𝛾 ∈ [𝛾min, 𝛾max] employment is given by labor
demand. Expected earnings are then
E(Υ) = ∫
𝛾min
𝛾min
Υ(ld(w̄))g(𝛾)d𝛾 = w̄
r ∫
𝛾min
𝛾min
(R − w̄ + 𝛾)g(𝛾)d𝛾 = w̄
r
(R − w̄).
Hence, ifR∕2 >w∗(𝛾max), expected earnings aremaximized at w̄ = R∕2 = E((R + 𝛾)∕2). However, ifR∕2 ≤ w∗(𝛾max) then
dE(Υ)∕dw̄ < 0 in this range.
If, instead, the minimum wage is set in the low range, w̄ < w∗(𝛾min), then employment is given by labor supply at
w = w̄ , and so earnings can be increased by raising w̄ out of this range at least as far asw∗(𝛾min).
Thus, provided R∕2 ≤ w∗(𝛾max), E(Υ) is maximized in themiddle range w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min),w∗(𝛾max)]. In this range, parallel
to (7), themaximand is
E(Υ) = ∫
𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄)
Υ
(
l∗(𝛾)
)
g(𝛾)d𝛾 + ∫
𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
Υ(ld(w̄))g(𝛾)d𝛾 ≡ Υd. (13)
Using (13) we then obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. Consider the minimum wage w̄ that maximizes expected earnings when there is labor demand uncertainty. If
R∕2, thewage atwhich expected labor demand is unit-elastic, is at least as large asw∗(𝛾max) the optimalminimumwage is R∕2;
if R∕2 ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)) the optimal minimumwage w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)) and is less than R∕2; but if R∕2 ≤ w∗(𝛾min)
nominimumwage should be set.
Here, the condition for it to be optimal to set aminimumwage is that R∕2 > w∗(𝛾min). Using (11), this can bewritten
as R(r − s) − 2(Sr + s𝛾min) > 0. By a parallel argument to that made in relation to Proposition 1 for labor supply uncer-
tainty, it follows that, with expected earningsmaximization, the existence of labor demand uncertainty extends the set
of parameter values for which it is optimal to set a minimum wage. However, in Proposition 4 the minimum wage is
potentially below R∕2, and so it is qualitatively different to the solution for supply uncertainty.
The intuitive rationale for this result can be seen from Figure 3. Suppose first that labor demand is known (𝛾 = 0),
with intercept R. Given that labor supply ls(w) cuts labor demand ld(w,0) above R∕2, a minimum wage should not be
set. Now suppose instead that labor demand is stochastic, and assume that 𝛾min is sufficiently negative for l
d(w, 𝛾min)
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F IGURE 3 Expected earnings with stochastic labor demand
to intersect with ls(w) below R∕2, as shown. If the minimum wage w̄ = E((R + 𝛾)∕2) = R∕2 were set, then for all low
demand realizations (𝛾 < 0), (R + 𝛾)∕2would be lower thanR∕2, while for all high demand realizations (𝛾 > 0) (R + 𝛾)∕2
would be higher thanR∕2. But, for any given realization 𝛾 , earnings aremaximized atw = (R + 𝛾)∕2. Therefore, because
for any realization 𝛾 < 0 amarginal reduction in w̄would be in the direction of (R + 𝛾)∕2, this would raise realized earn-
ings. But for any realization 𝛾 > 0, theminimumwagewould not bind and so the reduction in theminimumwagewould
have no effect on earnings. Thus, the expectation of earnings would be increased by the reduction in w̄.
This discussion highlights two properties of expected-earnings maximization for stochastic labor demand that are
consistent with our theme that uncertainty leads to a (weakly) lower optimal minimum wage. First, for values of the
parameters (R, S, r, s) for which, under certainty, a minimum wage should not be set, with uncertainty—as represented
by a sufficiently large 𝛾min—a minimum wage becomes optimal. Second, the optimal minimum wage in this case is less
than w̄ = E((R + 𝛾)∕2) = R∕2.
4.2 Expectedworker surplus for stochastic labor demand
When the government maximizes expected worker surplus with stochastic demand, the qualitative results are simi-
lar to the stochastic supply case. The main difference is that an extra condition must be imposed for concavity of the
objective function when uncertainty is sufficiently large and rationing relatively efficient.
For w̄ in the high range w̄ > w∗(𝛾max), demand ld(w̄) = (R + 𝛾 − w̄)∕r is a binding constraint, regardless of the realiza-
tion 𝛾 . Expectedworker surplus isΩI(𝛾), as given by setting 𝜙 = 0 in (4). Let
𝛾0 =
(R − S)r[𝛼(r + s) − s]
s[2𝛼(r + s) − s]
and 𝛾1 = −
𝛼r(R − S)
2𝛼(r + s) − s
.
Parallel to thedefinitionof𝜙0 for supplyuncertainty, 𝛾0 is thevalueof 𝛾 atwhichw
∗(𝛾) = ŵ(𝛼), whereas 𝛾1 is thevalueof
𝛾 at which 𝛾 + S = ŵ(𝛼). Then, corresponding to Lemma 1 for supply uncertainty, we specify conditions under which (8)
is a well-defined local optimum for w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). Lemma 2 parallels Lemma 1 except that it has the additional require-
ment that 𝛾min > 𝛾1. As we restrict attention to w̄ < R + 𝛾min, this requirement is needed so that ŵ(𝛼) < R + 𝛾min.
Lemma 2. With labor demand uncertainty, if 𝛾max < 𝛾0, 𝛾min > 𝛾1 and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), the minimum wage w̄ that maximizes
expected worker surplus for w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾max), R] is ŵ(𝛼), as given by (8). If 𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0 or 𝛼 ≤ s∕(s + r), the minimum wage that
maximizes expected worker surplus cannot be strictly higher than w∗(𝛾max).
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Consider now aminimumwage in the low range w̄ < w∗(𝛾min). In this case, regardless of the realization of 𝛾 , w̄ does
not bind, and so the freemarket wagew∗(𝛾) and employment l∗(𝛾) obtain, as given by (11).Worker surplus is
Ω(l∗(𝛾)) = s(R + 𝛾 − S)2∕2(r + s)2. (14)
Expectedworker surplus is therefore
s[(R − S)2 + E(𝛾2)]∕2(r + s)2 ≡ ΩdU,
which is independent of w̄.
Finally, suppose w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)] (so that 𝛾∗(w̄) ∈ [𝛾min, 𝛾max]). In this range, any w̄ ≤ w∗(𝛾) (i.e., 𝛾 ≥ 𝛾∗(w̄)),
is nonbinding and worker surplus is given by Ω(l∗(𝛾)) in (14). For w̄ ≥ w∗(𝛾) (i.e., 𝛾 < 𝛾∗(w̄)) there is excess supply and
worker surplus isΩI(𝛾), as given by (4) with 𝜙 = 0. Expected worker surplus is therefore
E(Ω) = ∫
𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄)
Ω(l∗(𝛾))g(𝛾)d𝛾 + ∫
𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
ΩI(𝛾)g(𝛾)d𝛾 ≡ Ωd. (15)
We can now derive the following result.
Proposition 5. With labor demand uncertainty and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), theminimumwage thatmaximizes expectedworker surplus
is ŵ(𝛼), as given by (8), if 𝛾max < 𝛾0 and Ωd is single-peaked, but it lies in the range (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)] and is strictly lower
than ŵ(𝛼) if 𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0.
Assuming that rationing is relatively efficient (𝛼 > s∕(r + s)), if uncertainty is small enough (𝛾max < 𝛾0), a sufficient
condition for the optimal minimum wage to be w̄ = ŵ(𝛼) in the high range (and certainly binding) is that Ωd is single-
peaked.16 If uncertainty is larger (𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0), the optimal minimum wage is in the middle range (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)], so
that it may or may not bind and is strictly lower than ŵ(𝛼) . We show in the proof of Proposition 5 that Ωd must have
an inflexion point in this range. If the inflexion point is unique,Ωd is single-peaked and so the optimal minimumwage is
also unique. A sufficient condition for this is for d2Ωd∕dw̄2 to be strictly monotonic on (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]. This is true,
for instance, if 𝛾 is uniformly distributed.
Finally, for low rationing efficiency, 𝛼 ≤ s∕(r + s), a result parallel to that for supply uncertainty obtains.
Proposition 6. With labor demand uncertainty, if 𝛼 ≤ s∕(r + s), expected worker surplus is maximized by not setting a mini-
mumwage.
As in the case of stochastic labor supply, this result does not depend on the amount of uncertainty.
5 CONCLUSION
Recognition of regulatory uncertainty might be expected to diminish the case for policy intervention such as a mini-
mumwage. However, if the objective is to maximize expected earnings, such uncertainty expands the range of param-
eter values for which a minimum wage should be set, though it has a weakly negative effect on the optimal level. This
minimumwagemay ormay not bind ex post. Additionally, the qualitative impact of the uncertainty depends onwhether
the uncertainty relates to supply or demand. In the former case the optimal minimum wage is obtained by a simple
modification of the unit-demand-elasticity rule that applies under certainty, whereas in the latter case the solution is
less clear-cut.
If the objective is to maximize expected worker surplus, a minimum wage should always be set, provided the effi-
ciency of employment rationing is above a critical level. Uncertainty has no effect on whether a minimumwage should
be used, but, as with expected earnings maximization, if uncertainty is sufficiently great, the minimumwage should be
16 Without this condition we cannot rule out the possibility thatΩd will be greater in themiddle than in the high range.
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set at a level that may or may not bind. This minimumwage is lower than the optimal minimumwage when there is no
uncertainty. Thus, our analysis shows that regulatory uncertainty has aweakly negative effect on the optimalminimum
wage, but does not reduce the scope for intervention.
Our qualitative results would still apply if profit were added to the worker-surplus objective function, though with
a lower weight. Also, future research might develop the analysis for more general demand and supply functions and
for monopsony. We conjecture that the optimal minimum wage will then be weakly higher than with perfect compe-
tition to keep up expected worker surplus or earnings for those realizations at which monopsonistic behavior, but not
competition, would be restrictive.
Themainmessage of our paper, that regulatory uncertainty does not undermine the case for introducing aminimum
wage but that itmay call for a conservative level to be set, bears on recent debates. For theminimumwage law recently
rejected by Switzerland, theKaitz index (the ratio of theminimumwage tomedian earnings)was 2/3,which, it was said,
would have been the highest in the world (Financial Times, May 18, 2014). In contrast, a minimum wage with a Kaitz
index of 1/2 was adopted by Germany. Although this puts the German minimum wage well above the OECD average,
the rejection of a higher minimum wage in Switzerland and adoption of a somewhat lower one in Germany could be
regarded as consistent with our analysis. However, the determination of an appropriately conservative level for the
minimumwage remains an empirical question.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider the two parts of (7) in turn. The first term is the value of E(Υ) conditional on w̄ ≤ w∗(𝜙)
(i.e.,𝜙 ≥ 𝜙∗(w̄)). w̄ does not bind, so from (5),Υ = l∗(𝜙)w∗(𝜙) = [(S + 𝜙)r + Rs](R − S − 𝜙)∕(r + s)2, and
∫
𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄)
Υ(l∗(𝜙))f(𝜙)d𝜙 =
(Sr + Rs)(R − S)(1 − F(𝜙∗(w̄))) − (2Sr + Rs − Rr)𝜖Hs (𝜙
∗(w̄)) − r𝜎Hs (𝜙
∗(w̄))
(r + s)2
,
where 𝜖Hs (𝜙
∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄) 𝜙f(𝜙)d𝜙 and 𝜎
H
s (𝜙
∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄) 𝜙
2f(𝜙)d𝜙.
The second term is E(Υ) conditional on w̄ > w∗(𝜙) (i.e., 𝜙 < 𝜙∗(w̄)). There is excess supply, so Υ = w̄ld(w) = w̄(R − w̄)∕r.
The conditional expectation ofΥ is then
∫
𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
Υ(ld(w̄))f(𝜙)d𝜙 = 1
r ∫
𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
w̄(R − w̄)f(𝜙)d𝜙 = 1
r
F(𝜙∗(w̄))w̄(R − w̄),
Substituting these expressions into (7) and using (6),17
dΥs
dw̄
= 1
r
(R − 2w̄)F(𝜙∗(w̄)) and
d2Υs
dw̄2
= −2
r
F(𝜙∗(w̄)) + r + s
r2
(R − 2w̄)F′(𝜙∗(w̄)).
Now consider how the global optimum changes with R∕2. If R∕2 is below the high range, Υs is increased by reducing w̄ at
least to w∗(𝜙max). If R∕2 is above the low range Υs is weakly increased if w̄ is raised at least to w∗(𝜙min). If R∕2 belongs to
the middle range [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)] then, using the expression above, dΥs∕dw̄ is positive at w̄ = w∗(𝜙min) and negative at
w̄ = w∗(𝜙max). Since the f.o.c. dΥs∕dw̄ = 0 is satisfied at w̄ = R∕2, at which the second order condition (s.o.c.) d2Υs∕dw̄2 < 0
holds, the proposition follows. ■
Proof of Lemma1. If 𝛼 < 2s∕(r + s) then ŵ(𝛼) > R, which is inconsistent with the range (w∗(𝜙max), R] (and gives an E(ΩI(𝜙))-
minimum). If𝛼 > s∕2(r + s) and𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0, dE(ΩI(𝜙))∕dw̄ < 0 for all w̄ > w∗(𝜙max); also, ŵ(𝛼) ≤ w∗(𝜙max), which is inconsis-
tent with the range (w∗(𝜙max), R]. If 𝛼 ∈ (s∕2(r + s), s∕(r + s)), since R > S and 𝜙max > 0 , the condition 𝜙max > 𝜙0 is trivially
satisfied, and so ŵ(𝛼) < w∗(𝜙max). However, if𝜙max < 𝜙0 and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), as d2E(ΩI(𝜙))∕dw̄2 < 0, (8) is awell-defined local
maximumwithin the range (w∗(𝜙max), R]. ■
17 It is straightforward to show that expected earnings are continuous and differentiable at the boundaries of the middle range with the other ranges, as well
as within each range (though for brevity we do not show this). This comment also applies for the other optimizations we undertake.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Assume 𝛼 > s∕(r + s). Suppose 𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0 and consider w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Substituting for
the two terms in (10) and differentiating w.r.t. w̄ we find the local optimum for w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Using (4) and (9),
∫
𝜙max
𝜙∗(w̄)
Ω
(
l∗(𝜙)
)
f(𝜙)d𝜙 = s
2(r + s)2
[
(1−F(𝜙∗(w̄))(R − S)2 − 2𝜖Hs (𝜙
∗(w̄))(R − S) + 𝜎Hs (𝜙
∗(w̄))
]
and
∫
𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
ΩI(𝜙)f(𝜙)d𝜙 =
R − w̄
2r2
{
F(𝜙∗(w̄))[2𝛼r(w̄ − S) + (1 − 2𝛼)s(R − w̄)] − 2𝛼r𝜖Ls (𝜙
∗(w̄))
}
,
where 𝜖Ls (𝜙
∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝜙∗(w̄)
𝜙min
𝜙f(𝜙)d𝜙. Substituting these expressions into (10) and using (6), we obtain
dΩs
dw̄
= 𝛼
r
𝜖Ls (𝜙
∗(w̄)) + 1
r2
F(𝜙∗(w̄))
{[
2𝛼(r + s) − s
]
(R − w̄) − 𝛼r(R − S)
}
; (16)
d2Ωs
dw̄2
= − 1
r2
F(𝜙∗(w̄))[2𝛼(r + s) − s] + 1
r3
(R − w̄) (r + s) [𝛼(r + s) − s] F′(𝜙∗(w̄)).
With𝛼 > s∕(r + s), because 𝜖Ls (𝜙min) = F(𝜙min) = 0, w
∗(𝜙min) satisfies the f.o.c. dΩs∕dw̄ = 0. However, this is a localminimum,
forΩs is convex at this point. In addition, we have seen that all w̄ < w∗(𝜙min) result in the same levels of expectedworker surplus
as w̄ = w∗(𝜙min) does.
Using (6)and (16), dΩs∕w∗(𝜙max) < 0 iff𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0. Also, by Lemma1, if𝛼 > s∕(r + s)and𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0 there is no candidate
optimal w̄ > w∗(𝜙max), and so the global optimal w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Furthermore, we can show that there is a unique
optimal w̄ in this interval. For 𝛼 > s∕(r + s),
sign
d2Ωs
dw̄2
= sign
(
F′(𝜙∗(w̄))
F(𝜙∗(w̄))
− (2𝛼(r + s) − s) r
(r + s) (𝛼(r + s) − s)
1
R − w̄
)
.
By assumption, F′(𝜙)∕ (1 − F(𝜙)) is strictly increasing on (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)], and so F′(𝜙)∕ F(𝜙) is strictly decreasing in
this range.18 As 1∕(R − w̄) is strictly increasing in w̄, Ωs has a unique inflexion point at wsI . At w
∗(𝜙min), when 𝛼 > s∕(r + s),
d2Ωs∕dw̄2 > 0, so that the function is convex for all w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙min), wsI ). However, if w̄ > w
s
I
, 1∕(R − w̄)will take a lower value
and F′(𝜙∗(w̄))∕ F(𝜙∗(w̄)) a higher one, so that d2Ωs∕dw̄2 ≤ 0 for all w̄ ∈ (wsI , w∗(𝜙max)). Hence, if 𝛼 > s∕(r + s) and𝜙min ≥ 𝜙0,
there is a unique optimal w̄ on (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)].
We have seen that if 𝜙max < 𝜙0, the optimal w̄ = ŵ(𝛼) cannot lie in the range (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Together with the
findings in Lemma 1, this establishes the solutions for both𝜙max < 𝜙0 and𝜙max ≥𝜙0. It remains to compare the values of w̄ in
these two solutions.
When 𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0, so that the optimal w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)], ŵ(𝛼) also belongs in this range. However, evaluating (16)
at ŵ(𝛼), we obtain
dΩs
(
ŵ(𝛼)
)
dw̄
= 𝛼
r
𝜖Ls (𝜙
∗(ŵ(𝛼))) ≤ 0, (17)
which holds with equality only for 𝜙max = 𝜙0 (or, w∗(𝜙max) = p̂). Therefore, if 𝜙max ≥ 𝜙0 the optimal w̄ on
(w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)] is strictly lower than ŵ(𝛼). ■
Proof of Proposition 3. Assume 𝛼 ≤ s∕(r + s). Then, from (16), dΩs(w∗(𝜙min))∕dw̄ = 0 and d2Ωs(w∗(𝜙min))∕dw̄2 < 0, so
that w∗(𝜙min) is a local maximum on w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)]. Also, from (4), dE(ΩI(𝜙))∕dw̄ < 0 for all w̄ > w∗(𝜙max).
Finally, any w̄ ≤ w∗(𝜙min) does not bind, and so gives the same outcome. Therefore w∗(𝜙min) is a well-defined maximum in
the range [w∗(𝜙min), w∗(𝜙max)], and any w̄ < w∗(𝜙min) yields the same outcome, whereasΩs is lower for w̄ > w∗(𝜙max). This
proves the result. ■
Proof of Proposition 4. We first derive the f.o.c. and s.o.c. for the middle range w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)].
18 The strictly increasing hazard rate can bewritten, F′′(𝜙)(1 − F(𝜙)) + (F′(𝜙))2 = x > 0.However, sign( dd𝜙 (F
′(𝜙)∕F(𝜙))) = sign(F′′(𝜙)F(𝜙) − (F′(𝜙))2) = sign(y).
But since x = F′′(𝜙)(1 − F(𝜙)) + (F′(𝜙))2 > 0, F′′(𝜙)F(𝜙) − (F′(𝜙))2 = y < F′′(𝜙)F(𝜙) + F′′(𝜙)(1 − F(𝜙)) = F′′(𝜙) < 0; i.e., F′(𝜙)∕F(𝜙) is strictly decreasing.
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We consider the two parts of (13) in turn. If w̄ ≤ w∗(𝛾) (i.e., 𝛾 ≥ 𝛾∗(w̄)) w̄ does not bind, so that, from (11), Υ = l∗w∗(𝛾) =
[Sr + (R + 𝛾)s](R + 𝛾 − S)∕ (r + s)2. E(Υ) in this range is therefore
∫
𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄)
Υ
(
l∗(𝛾)
)
g(𝛾)d𝛾 = 1
(r + s)2 ∫
𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄)
[Sr + (R + 𝛾)s] (R + 𝛾 − S) g(𝛾)d𝛾
= 1
(r + s)2
[
(Sr + Rs)(R − S)(1 − G(𝛾∗(w̄))) + (2Rs + Sr − sS)𝜖Hd (𝛾
∗(w̄)) + s𝜎Hd (𝛾
∗(w̄))
]
,
where 𝜖H
d
(𝛾∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄) 𝛾g(𝛾)d𝛾 and 𝜎
H
d
(𝛾∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄) 𝛾
2g(𝛾)d𝛾 . However, if w̄ > w∗(𝛾) (i.e., 𝛾 < 𝛾∗(w̄)) there is excess sup-
ply, so thatΥ = w̄ld(w) = w̄(R + 𝛾 − w̄)∕r. E(Υ) is
∫
𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
Υ(ld(w̄))g(𝛾)d𝛾 = w̄
r ∫
𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
(R − w̄ + 𝛾) g(𝛾)d𝛾 = w̄
r
[
(R − w̄)G(𝛾∗(w̄)) + 𝜖Ld(w̄)
]
,
where 𝜖L
d
(𝛾∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
𝛾g(𝛾)d𝛾 .
Substituting these expressions into (13), and using (12), we obtain
dΥd
dw̄
= 1
r
(R − 2w̄)G(𝛾∗(w̄)) + 1
r
𝜖Ld(w̄);
d2Υd
dw̄2
= −2
r
G(𝛾∗(w̄)) − (s + r) w̄(s − r) + rS
rs2
G′(𝛾∗(w̄)).
The second derivative above can be written
d2Υd
dw̄2
= −2G
′(𝛾∗(w̄))
r
[
G(𝛾∗(w̄))
G′(𝛾∗(w̄))
+ (s + r) w̄(s − r) + rS
2s2
]
.
If s ≥ r this is negative. But suppose s < r. Since dΥd∕dw̄ > 0 at w̄ = 𝛾min and dΥd∕dw̄ < 0 at w̄ = w∗(𝛾max), there can
only be one turning point of Υd in the middle range unless d2Υd∕dw̄2 = 0 at least three times in this range. But, given that
G′(𝛾∗(w̄))∕(1 − G(𝛾∗(w̄)) is increasing in w̄ , so also is G(𝛾∗(w̄))∕G′(𝛾∗(w̄)), while (s + r)[w̄(s − r) + rS]∕2s2 is decreasing in w̄.
Therefore d2Υd∕dw̄2 = 0 only once. It follows thatΥd is concave in this range.
If R∕2 ≤ w∗(𝛾min), dΥd∕dw̄ < 0 for all w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]. But we have seen that then dE(Υ)∕dw̄ < 0 in the high
range, while w̄ should always be raised out of the low range. Therefore, if R∕2 ≤ w∗(𝛾min) it is optimal to set the w̄ = w∗(𝛾min),
i.e., in effect, there is no minimumwage.
Because 𝜖L
d
(𝛾min) = 𝜖Ld(𝛾max) = 0, if R∕2 ∈ (w
∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)) then dΥd∕dw̄ > 0 at w̄ = 𝛾min and dΥd∕dw̄ < 0 at w̄ =
w∗(𝛾max). Therefore a solution interior to the middle range, w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)) obtains. Since then 𝜖Ld(𝛾
∗(w̄)) < 0, for
dΥd∕dw̄ = 0 it is necessary that w̄ < R∕2, while if R∕2 = w∗(𝛾max)we have that dΥd∕dw̄ = 0 at w̄ = w∗(𝛾max). Since the s.o.c.
is satisfied the proposition follows. ■
Proof of Lemma 2. If 𝛼 > s∕2(r + s) and 𝛾max > 𝛾0, ŵ(𝛼) < w∗(𝛾max), which is inconsistent with the range w̄ > w∗(𝛾max),
while dΩI(𝛾)∕dw̄ < 0 for w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). But when 𝛾max < 𝛾0 and 𝛼 > s∕(r + s), ŵ(𝛼) is a well-defined maximum, consistent
with w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). To ensure that ŵ(𝛼) < R + 𝛾min it is necessary that 𝛾min > 𝛾1 . ■
Proof of Proposition 5. We first derive the f.o.c. for w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]. Using (14), the first term in (15) can be written
∫
𝛾max
𝛾∗(w̄)
Ω
(
l∗(𝛾)
)
g(𝛾)d𝛾 =
s
[
(1 − G(𝛾∗(w̄)))(R − S)2 + 2𝜖H
d
(𝛾∗(w̄))(R − S) + 𝜎H
d
(𝛾∗(w̄))
]
2(r + s)2
.
Using (4), the second term in (15) can be written
∫
𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
ΩI(𝛾)g(𝛾)d𝛾 =
1
2r2
(R − w̄)
[
2𝛼r(w̄ − S) + (1 − 2𝛼)s (R − w̄)
]
G(𝛾∗(w̄))
+ 1
2r2
{[
2𝛼r(w̄ − S) + 2(1 − 2𝛼)s(R − w̄)
]
𝜖Ld(𝛾
∗(w̄)) + (1 − 2𝛼)s𝜎Ld(𝛾
∗(w̄))
}
,
where 𝜖L
d
(𝛾∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
𝛾g(𝛾)d𝛾 and 𝜎L
d
(𝛾∗(w̄)) = ∫ 𝛾∗(w̄)
𝛾min
𝛾2g(𝛾)d𝛾 .
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Substituting these expressions into (15) and using (12), we obtain
dΩd
dw̄
= 1
r2
[
𝛼(2s + r) − s
]
𝜖Ld(𝛾
∗(w̄)) + 1
r2
G(𝛾∗(w̄)){(R − w̄)[𝛼(r + 2s) − s] − 𝛼r(w̄ − S)}; (18)
d2Ωd
dw̄2
= − 1
r2
G(𝛾∗(w̄))[2𝛼(s + r) − s] + 1
r2s2
(w̄ − S)r(r + s) [𝛼(r + s) − s]G′(𝛾∗(w̄)).
As 𝜖L
d
(𝛾min) = G(𝛾min) = 0, w∗(𝛾min) satisfies the f.o.c. (18) for w̄ ∈[w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]. However, if 𝛼 > s∕(s + r), w∗(𝛾min)
gives a local minimum because the objective function is convex at this point. Therefore,Ωd is decreasing in w̄ as it approaches
w∗(𝛾min) from above, whereas, using (12) and (18), iff 𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0, Ωd is decreasing at w∗(𝛾max). Also, we have seen that all
w̄ < w∗(𝛾min) result in the sameΩd as w̄ = w∗(𝛾min), whereas, by Lemma2, if 𝛼 > s∕(s + r) and 𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0, there is no candidate
w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). Hence, if 𝛼 > s∕(s + r) and 𝛾max ≥ 𝛾0, the globally optimal w̄ must belong to (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)].
Also, for w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)], if Ωd has a unique inflexion point there is a unique optimal w̄ in this range. A sufficient
condition for this is that d2Ωd∕dw̄2 is strictly monotonic. When 𝛼 > s∕(s + r) ,
sign
d2Ωd
dw̄2
= sign[hg
(
𝛾∗(w̄)
)
(R − w̄) − Δ],
whereΔ =(2𝛼(s + r) − s)s2∕ (𝛼(s + r) − s)r(s + r) andhg(𝛾∗(w̄)) =G′(𝛾∗(w̄))∕ (1 − G(𝛾∗(w̄))), which, by assumption, is strictly
increasing. Since hg(𝛾∗(w̄))(R − w̄) is monotonic in w̄ over this range, hg(𝛾∗(w̄))(R − w̄) − Δ = 0 has a unique solution and so
the inflexion point is unique andΩd is single-peaked on w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)].
If 𝛼 > s∕(s + r) but 𝛾max < 𝛾0,Ωd is increasing at w∗(𝛾max). ProvidedΩd is single-peaked on w̄ ∈ (w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)], then,
given Lemma 2, w̄ = ŵ(𝛼), as given by (8), is the global optimum.
From (18), dΩd(ŵ(𝛼))∕dw̄ = [𝛼(2s + r) − s]𝜖Ld(𝛾
∗(ŵ(𝛼)))∕r2 ≤ 0. A parallel argument then follows that made for (17). ■
Proof of Proposition 6. From (16), dΩd(w∗(𝛾min))∕dw̄ = 0 and d2Ωd(w∗(𝛾min))∕ dw̄2 < 0, so that w∗(𝛾min) is a local max-
imum on w̄ ∈ [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)]. Also, from Lemma 2, dE(ΩI(𝛾))∕dw̄ < 0 for all w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). Finally, any w̄ ≤ w∗(𝛾min)
does not bind, so gives the same outcome. Therefore w∗(𝛾min) is a well-defined maximum on [w∗(𝛾min), w∗(𝛾max)], and any
w̄ < w∗(𝛾min) yields the same outcome, whereasΩd is lower for w̄ > w∗(𝛾max). This proves the result. ■
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